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Abstract
In recent decades the landscape architectural discourse has tended to es-
chew ideas of aesthetics while focusing instead on notions of functional 
and sustainable design. We offer the view that Aesthetic Creation Theory, 
whose principal exponent is the philosopher Nick Zangwill, has the poten-
tial to redress this imbalance by interpreting landscape architecture as ‘art’. 
Zangwill’s account of ‘art’ differs, however, from many other definitions 
found in philosophical aesthetics: it holds that works of art have aesthetic 
functions that are essential to them, but also allows that they have other, 
non-aesthetic functions, for example practical or ecological ones. It thus 
removes the strict distinction between fine art and the useful arts. After 
introducing Zangwill’s theory, we discuss some rival theories of art and 
then explore the virtues of Aesthetic Creation Theory for the theory, prac-
tice, and pedagogy of landscape architecture.
Aesthetic Creation Theory / criticism / landscape architecture /  
philosophical aesthetics / theory 
‘Landscape architecture is […] a blend of science and art, vision and thought. 
It is a creative profession skilled in strategic planning, delivery and man-
agement. Landscape architects bring knowledge of natural sciences, envi-
ronmental law and planning policy. […] And they create delight with beau-
tiful designs, protecting and enhancing our most cherished landscapes and 
townscapes’ (Landscape Institute 2012: 1).
Redressing an imbalance in landscape architectural theory
Searching for a contemporary definition of landscape architecture, this text 
by the Landscape Institute is rare in that it mentions art, vision, creativ-
ity, delight, and beauty. Many other definitions avoid these words, such 
as the one offered by the International Federation of Landscape Architects 
(2003). This is symptomatic: in an age which values science and rationality, 
landscape architectural discourse has tended to eschew ideas of aesthetics 
in favour of notions of functional and sustainable design. This seems to 
apply particularly to some influential movements in North America and 
Europe, such as Landscape Urbanism (for example, Waldheim 2006; cp. Her-
rington 2010; Thompson 2012).
These positivistic and technocratic tendencies have been criticized by 
some authors within the discipline_criticism that has gained momen-
tum in recent years (Dee 2012; Gustavsson 2012; Herrington 2008; 2010; 2011; 
Meyer 2008; Treib 2011). Sharing the concern that landscape architecture 
theory has fallen seriously out of balance, and that this does not serve 
the discipline well (Hunt 2000: 6), we suggest that recent work in philo-
sophical aesthetics, particularly the Aesthetic Creation Theory proposed 
by philosopher Nick Zangwill (2007) in his book Aesthetic Creation, has the 
potential to redress this imbalance. The wider field of philosophical aes-
thetics is concerned with the aesthetic appreciation of both works of art 
and our environment. While environmental philosophers like Arnold 
Berleant (1992) and Allen Carlson (2002) concentrate on our appreciation 
of the natural and vernacular environment, Zangwill primarily engages 
our appreciation of works of art. Zangwill’s theory is an aesthetic theory 
of art following Monroe Beardsley (1958/1981), whose book Aesthetics is the 
first systematic and critically informed philosophy of art in the analytic 
tradition (cp. Wreen 2014). Other proposals have been made, on the one 
hand, by Arthur Danto (1964), who first proferred an institutional theory 
of art in which members of the artworld, such as curators, critics, and gal-
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lery owners, define what is to be considered as art. Aesthetic theories, on 
the other hand, focus on the characteristics of the work, rather than on 
the context in which the work was produced.
Both our agenda and our approach, that is an emphasis on the essential 
role of aesthetics for a sounder theory and richer practice of landscape ar-
chitecture, as well as our turn to analytic philosophy, tie in with previous 
work by authors from landscape architecture. For example, many studies 
have explored the aesthetics of gardens (Miller 1993; Ross 1985; 2001; Cooper 
2006), but we suspect that the explicit restriction to ‘gardens’ may have 
hampered the reception of this work within broader landscape architec-
tural discourse. Hoping to reach a wider audience, we are thus explicitly 
addressing the aesthetics of ‘landscapes’, which implies an exploration of 
the contributions that landscape architects make to urban renewal, de-
velopment of new nature, work on infrastructure, flood defences, etc. Su-
san Herrington’s book On Landscapes has a similarly comprehensive un-
derstanding of landscape, using various theories and analytic approaches 
to explain the limitations and potential of landscapes. In one of her book 
chapters, she also deals with aesthetic experience (Herrington 2008: 111–130). 
Here, the author argues elegantly against evolutionary theories and the 
conflation of the aesthetic with the visual. Other seminal contributions to 
landscape architectural discourse, from Laurie Olin, Marc Treib, Jean Gil-
lette, and (again) Susan Herrington, focus on the question of what gardens 
mean (Treib 2011). However, while questions of meaning and aesthetics are 
intimately linked, as Eva Gustavsson (2012) urges us to see, they are never-
theless distinct from one another. Our paper thus adds ‘to a conversation 
that is endlessly ongoing’ (Gillette 2011: 171), recommending a more nu-
anced understanding of the relationship between meaning and aesthetics.
It is precisely here, in thinking through the structure of aesthetic the-
ories, that we believe turning to the philosopher Zangwill could be fruit-
ful because Zangwill emphasizes_in the tradition of analytic philosophy_
clarity, rigour, argument, theory, and truth. The landscape architectural 
discourse of recent years has tended to eschew ideas of aesthetics. We be-
lieve that this is partly a consequence of the structure of older theories of 
art. Zangwill’s Aesthetic Creation Theory allows us to see landscape archi-
tecture (again) as an art, but without the lofty pretensions of art for art’s 
sake. Zangwill’s theory holds that works of art have aesthetic functions, 
which are essential to them, but also allows that they have other, non-
aesthetic functions, such as practical or ecological ones. Aesthetic Crea-
tion Theory focuses on the creation side of art, which is why it is called 
Aesthetic ‘Creation’ Theory. While this is not unproblematic for an un-
derstanding of landscape architecture that wishes to consider its users, it 
may tie in with what Gillette (2011: 172) refers to as the New Aestheticism, 
a recent shift ‘from theories that validate the user towards arguments that 
validate the maker of the artefact’.
The point of our paper, however, is not to prove that landscape architec-
ture is intrinsically an art and only an art_if one understands art as being 
fine art. Neither do we believe that Zangwill’s theory holds the key to all 
questions within the aesthetical discourse in landscape architecture. We 
advance it in a spirit of experimentation, asking several questions: How far 
can the theory be taken? How good is Aesthetic Creation Theory as an ex-
planation for what happens when landscape architects design landscapes? 
What are its implications for landscape architecture? But, most impor-
tantly, we assert that theorizing landscape architecture as a practice that 
strives for the creation of aesthetic values (alongside other values), pro-
vides a richer and more truthful account of the discipline.
Art and design
A distinction has often been made between the fine arts, such as painting, 
sculpture, music, and poetry (and latterly new forms like conceptual art, 
film, photography, and printmaking), and the applied or practical arts, 
such as furniture making, industrial design, glass-making, metalwork, 
ceramics, embroidery, and so on (Kristeller 1978; Herrington 2007: 307). Nowa-
days, gardening and landscape architecture are seldom viewed as art (Scru-
ton 1979: 5; Winters 2007: 4). In fact, the entire debate around high art versus 
low art may sometimes seem obsolete, especially with regard to landscape 
architecture. Indeed, neither practitioners nor scholars within the field use 
these phrases very often. However, first, we would argue that framing the 
discourse through the lens of this dichotomy and showing how it is over-
come within Zangwill’s Aesthetic Creation Theory may help to understand 
the reasons why landscape architecture has eschewed aesthetics, as well 
as how to move beyond this tendency. Second, the legacy of the high art / 
low art debate still informs, explicitly or implicitly, some strands within 
landscape architecture theory discourse. On the one hand, David Cooper 
(2006: 25) asserts, for example, that some gardens could certainly be con-
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sidered art and that the artworld and the garden-world overlap. Similarly, 
Geoffrey Jellicoe writes in the opening sentence of his introduction to The 
Landscape of Man: ‘The world is moving into a phase when landscape de-
sign may well be recognized as the most comprehensive of arts’ (Jellicoe & 
Jellicoe 1975: 7). On the other hand, Ian Thompson (2000: 73–89) has shown 
that only a small number of landscape architects believe that landscape 
architecture should aspire to be a fine art, with a much larger group navi-
gating by the beacon of ‘good design’, a position which would place land-
scape architecture in the applied arts category. 
Theorizing landscape architecture as an art should, however, not be 
seen as an attack on functional design; we are all in favour of designed 
landscapes that are aesthetically attractive and serve practical purposes. 
However, we do take issue with the doctrine of functionalism in its weak 
or strong forms. Weak functionalism states that good aesthetics will come 
about automatically by producing functionality. However, as several au-
thors have pointed out (Pye 1978; Scruton 1979: 38; Winters 2007: 47), function-
ality does not determine form. The need to meet functional criteria alone 
would ‘“underdetermine” the final product’, as Zangwill argues accord-
ingly (Zangwill 2007: 148, original emphasis). Strong functionalism, on the 
other hand, holds that aesthetics are simply irrelevant to landscape prac-
tice. The point of landscape architecture, according to this view, is to pro-
duce landscapes that function and perform well, for instance, in an ecolog-
ical sense, with no thought given to their appearance. This attitude can be 
said to inform, for instance, some of the programmatic writings of Land-
scape Urbanism (cp. Herrington 2010: 8; Thompson 2012: 12). Strong func-
tionalism, however, is at odds with the way most landscape architects see 
their work (compare the definition of landscape architecture provided by 
ECLAS 2014; Kapper & Chenoweth 2000) and how they practice it. To assume 
that aesthetic concerns were irrelevant, for instance in the design of a pro-
ject like the High Line Park in Manhattan by James Corner’s office Field 
Operations_one of Landscape Urbanism’s flagship projects_is utterly 
unsatisfactory (Figs. 1 & 2).
82
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Figure 1  Aesthetic qualities have obviously been relevant for  
the design of the High Line Park in New York City, created by  
James Corner’s firm Field Operations.
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Zangwill’s Aesthetic Creation Theory
Aesthetic creation theory as rational explanation
Art theory is often in the position of having to catch up with, and account 
for, developments in practice. So-called formalist theories of art were a re-
sponse to the arrival of abstract modernism. Arthur Danto’s institutional 
theory, further developed by George Dickie (1974; 1984), was a response to 
works by Duchamp and Warhol, who appropriated everyday objects and 
somehow turned them into art. The driving force of these developments, 
in theory, is extensional; that is, they attempt to (re)cover all of the objects 
considered as art. Zangwill rejects these extensional theories in favour of 
a theory of rational explanation; that is, a theory that makes our interest 
in art intelligible (Zangwill 2007: Chapter 1). Thus, he offers a theory that 
describes, but moreover explains, the practice of art. This may not deliver 
a theory which meets all extensional demands but it explains why we pro-
duce art and why we care about art. Zangwill’s is a theory in the sense that 
it offers a framework under which we can assess landscape architecture as 
an art (Deming & Swaffield 2011: 32-33).
Zangwill starts by stating that artworks are artefacts_they are made 
by human beings. Human beings do not produce objects randomly, but for 
reasons and with intentions, and in this sense they are functional objects 
(Zangwill 2007: 98). Of course, it is important to remember that not all ar-
tefacts are works of art. Starting from the question of why we produce art, 
Zangwill proposes that we do so because artworks provide us with pleasur-
able experiences. These pleasurable experiences are of a special kind_they 
are aesthetic pleasures. Aesthetic pleasures are, following Kant, distinct 
from the pleasures of emotional well-being, existential insight, intellec-
tual clarity, or the fulfilment of some sensual appetite. Zangwill means by 
this a pleasure that is ‘derived from making or contemplating particular 
works of art’ (Ibid.: 25). A landscape-related example would be the pleasure 
we feel, for instance, if we contemplate a particular garden scene that fea-
tures, say, a red-leaved tree in autumn against a clear-blue sky and enjoy 
the sound of its leaves rustling in the wind. Zangwill emphasizes that even 
though the aesthetic pleasure is of a special kind, it is nevertheless pleas-
ure. And the ‘pursuit of pleasure is an intelligible and rational pastime’ 
 (Ibid.: 11). The point of art is to provide these kinds of experiences (Ibid.: 98–99).
83
Figure 2  The train tracks of the High Line no longer serve any  
functional purpose, but do add to the distinctive quality of  
the project.
1-2016  |  Journal of Landscape Architecture
D
ow
nl
oa
de
d 
by
 [V
era
 V
ice
nz
ott
i] 
at 
11
:37
 25
 Fe
br
ua
ry
 20
16
 
84
Aesthetic properties and aesthetic dependence
Zangwill’s Aesthetic Creation Theory proposes that ‘[s]omething is a work 
of art because and only because someone had an insight that certain aes-
thetic properties would depend on certain non-aesthetic properties; and 
because of this, the thing was intentionally endowed with some of those 
aesthetic properties in virtue of the non-aesthetic properties, as envisaged 
in the insight’ (Ibid.: 36).
To understand this complex sentence, one needs to understand the dis-
tinction Zangwill makes, building on work by Frank Sibley and others (for 
example, Goldman 1990; Sibley 2001), between aesthetic and non-aesthetic 
properties, and also the way he believes them to be related: ‘Aesthetic 
properties may be purely verdictive or evaluative properties, such as beauty 
and ugliness, or aesthetic merit and demerit, if indeed these are different 
from beauty and ugliness. Aesthetic properties also include substantive 
aesthetic properties, such as elegance, daintiness, balance or frenzy. Non-
aesthetic properties include physical properties, such as shape and size, 
and secondary qualities, such as colours and sounds’ (Zangwill 2007: 37; see 
Table 1). Talk about aesthetic properties means much more than just beauty 
or even prettiness; rather it also includes ugliness, as well as the manifold 
range of substantive aesthetic properties.
It is important to understand how aesthetic and non-aesthetic proper-
ties are related. Some people might wonder how landscape architects can 
bring into being aesthetic properties, like for example elegance in a design. 
One cannot simply add five metres of elegance, or something like ten cubic 
metres of beauty, into the specifications or bill of quantities when build-
ing a garden, yet we can evaluate the resulting garden as elegant and there-
fore beautiful.
When we call something ‘beautiful’ we have grounds for making that evalu-
ation. One may not consider the lower part of the garden at the Villa Lante 
to be beautiful but, instead, constricted and rigid; that attribution would 
then rest on the symmetry of the design, in turn resting on the straight 
lines of cut box-hedges (Fig. 3), particularly in contrast with the more free-
flowing forms of trees in the upper part of the garden. ‘Verdictive proper-
ties depend on substantive aesthetic properties. Something may be beau-
tiful in virtue of being graceful’ (Ibid.: 38). Zangwill further states that the 
aesthetic properties depend, or supervene upon, these non-aesthetic prop-
erties (Zangwill 2001). ‘Supervenience’ is a key term in Zangwill’s theory. It 
is ‘best characterized in terms of the existence of necessities running from 
non-aesthetic to aesthetic properties’ (Zangwill 2007: 37). However, the aes-
thetic properties depend upon non-aesthetic properties in a non-straight-
forward manner; there is ‘dependence without laws’ (Ibid.: 38, Footnote 1; 
Sibley 2001: 46; Goldman 1995: 136). This means that there is no set of non-
aesthetic properties which necessarily leads to certain aesthetic proper-
ties; but, on the other hand, certain non-aesthetic properties do seem to 
exclude certain aesthetic properties (Zangwill 2007: 37; 83). A landscape de-
sign-related example might be as follows: a garden, like the lower part of 
Villa Lante, consisting entirely of straight lines and geometrical shapes 
(as non-aesthetic properties) could not be naturalistic (as a substantive 
aesthetic property), but conversely, not all irregular plantings are neces-
sarily naturalistic. Also, even though the non-aesthetic properties do not 
change, the aesthetic properties might change over time, due to changes 
in our value systems. The straight lines of the French formal gardens were 
interpreted differently after the advent of the more irregular English land-
scape style. What had seemed controlled and well maintained suddenly 
seemed strained and manicured.
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Figure 3    The lower part of the garden of the Villa  
Lante in Bagnaia, Italy: Its constricted and rigid appear-
ance is due to the symmetry of its design, which rests, 
in large part, on the straight lines of the box-hedges.IR
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Insight and intention
Two more key ideas in Zangwill’s theory are ‘insight’ and ‘intention’ (Ibid.: 
39–45). For an artefact to be a work of art, the designers have to have the in-
sight that certain aesthetic properties depend upon certain non-aesthet-
ic properties. They must believe that if they produce these non-aesthetic 
properties, the aesthetic properties will also be realized. ‘Insight’ must be 
distinguished from ‘idea’. An insight happens to a particular person. An 
idea is something that can be shared between persons. ‘Ideas are public, 
insight is personal’ (Ibid.: 44).
If the designers form the intention to realize the aesthetic properties 
in virtue of the non-aesthetic properties, based upon the original insight, 
and if they are able to realize the aesthetic properties through producing 
the relevant non-aesthetic properties (Ibid.: 40–41), the resulting artefact 
will be a work of art. Once again, to give an example from landscape ar-
chitecture: ‘Capability’ Brown had the insight that a beautiful landscape 
depended upon a smoothness of texture and the presence of certain qual-
ities of curve (Fig. 4). He believed that if he could create such curves and 
surfaces, the result would be beautiful. He was, in fact, in possession of 
the technical skill to be able to create these non-aesthetic qualities and in 
doing so he brought into being a work of art. Similarly, landscape garden-
er Humphry Repton predicted the aesthetic visual effects of his proposals 
to his clients in the form of Red Books (so named for their red bindings), 
which contained his observations on the present state of a client’s prop-
erty and his recommendations on how it might be improved (Figs. 5 & 6).
On meaning and multi-functional art
Zangwill admits that his theory might be thought old-fashioned in its re-
enthronement of beauty as the goal of artistic creation_though he qualifies 
‘beauty’ with the phrase ‘and other valuable aesthetic properties’ (Ibid.: 11). 
Table 1  Aesthetic and non-aesthetic properties accord-
ing to Aesthetic Creation Theory (Zangwill 2007: 37-38; 
61; 82; 100)
Figure 4  Chatsworth landscape park by Lancelot  
‘Capability’ Brown in Derbyshire, England
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Beauty lost its primacy during the rise of avant-garde work in the twenti-
eth century, and many might say that it is still a difficult concept to apply 
to contemporary conceptual art, where the emphasis is not on aesthetic 
properties but on meaning. Zangwill, however, thinks that ‘almost all con-
ceptual art also has significant aesthetic aspirations’ (Ibid: 63) and he cites 
Robert Smithson’s Spiral Jetty (much admired in landscape architectural 
circles) as an example of a work which ‘has plenty of formal aesthetic val-
ues’ (Ibid.: 62). He feels that even in cases where the aesthetic is not the 
most important aspect of the work ‘it is still important and indeed essen-
tial that the meanings of works are embodied in aesthetically significant 
ways’ (Ibid.: 63).
For Zangwill, meaningfulness and beauty are not mutually exclu-
sive properties in art, but neither do they necessarily belong together. He 
writes that ‘a work of art can have aesthetic values that depend on the 
meaning of the work, and aesthetic values need not be the only values of 
a work’ (Ibid.: 172). 
Some rival theories
Zangwill identifies his theory as an aesthetic theory of art, but not all 
theories of art are aesthetic theories. In established philosophical aesthet-
ics, theories of art fall into five categories: imitation theory, expression 
theory, formalist theory, institutional theory, and aesthetic theory (Car-
roll 1999); there are variations of these, but these are the main types. The 
shortcoming of the established theories, according to Zangwill, is that they 
are all extensional theories; for example, they try to cover all the objects 
intuitively classified as art (Zangwill 2007: Chapter 1), and they essentially 
involve a relation to an audience (Ibid.: Chapter 6). That there are compli-
cations when looking at landscape architecture as an art under all of these 
rival theories has been shown by Mara Miller (1993) and Thompson (2000). 
We limit ourselves here to a short account of Zangwill’s counterarguments 
to those types of art theory that are most relevant to landscape architec-
ture, namely institutional theories and audience theories.
Institutional theories work well at a sociological level, but less so philo-
sophically. In Dickie’s formulation, an artwork is any artefact (including 
found objects) which has been accepted as such by the artworld (Dickie 1974, 
1984). Prominent members of the artworld, such as gallery owners, cura-
tors, publishers, producers, and critics, have the appropriate authority to 
‘christen’ these pieces as works of art. These ‘passing-the-buck’ theories are 
extensionally successful, in that they cover all works that we consider to 
be art, including the hard cases like Fountain by Duchamp (Lopes 2014: 52). 
Zangwill (2007: 160–166) rightly criticizes these theories for their lack of 
explanatory power; they offer no account of the ‘qualities’ that might in-
terest a gallery director or a critic in the first place. While garden history 
has its own share of hard cases, probably most clearly illustrated by Mar-
tha Schwartz in The Bagel Garden (cp. Herrington 2008: 1), we try here first 
to develop a theory for the majority of landscape designs.
This brings us back to aesthetic theories, of which Aesthetic Creation 
Theory is a version. Zangwill builds upon Beardsley’s theory that art’s 
function is to produce aesthetic experiences. Beardsley argued that works 
of art were ‘intentionally endowed with a disposition to produce experi-
ences (in an audience)’ (Ibid.: 127), but this is where Zangwill parts com-
pany with him. The whole of Chapter 6 in Aesthetic Creation is devoted to 
arguments against audience theories: ‘a theory of what art is should not 
invoke any essential relationship to an audience’ (Ibid.). Zangwill’s theory 
is an ‘artist theory’ rather than an ‘audience theory’. This is not to deny the 
importance of an audience, but ‘a way of emphasizing artistic autonomy_ 
a lack of concern for others in making art’ (Ibid.: 147, original emphasis).
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Figure 5  A ‘before’ picture from one of Humphry Repton’s famous 
Red Books shows the state of his client’s estate before improvement. 
Figure 6  The corresponding ‘after’ picture shows Repton’s sugges-
tions for how to improve the estate. In his drawing, Repton evokes 
certain aesthetic qualities, which are to be reached by changing  
selected non-aesthetic properties: a manor house, the clearing of  
a lawn, the rearrangement of groups of trees, etc.
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Congruencies and virtues of Aesthetic Creation Theory 
for landscape architecture theory
Dissolution of high art / low art distinction
Zangwill’s theory has the virtue of removing the division between the fine 
and the decorative arts, which means that the products of designers are 
eligible to be considered as art (Ibid.: 50, 75–78). He states that it is necessary 
for the work of art to have an aesthetic goal (and landscapes indeed offer 
abundant aesthetic properties) but it need not be the ‘only’ goal. Designs 
for larger landscapes often include areas with specific functions, such as 
storing water or providing habitats, but as long as the design also has spe-
cific aesthetic intentions, it can still be considered a work of art.
Anne Whiston Spirn (1984) and Catherine Howett (1987) attempted, 
twenty years ago, to build ‘conceptual bridges between aesthetics and eco-
logical design’ (Meyer 2008: 8), arguing that art, sustainability, and function-
ality were not mutually exclusive. Our interpretation of Zangwill’s theory 
is meant to support contributions in this spirit, which strive to counter au-
thors who, to paraphrase Elizabeth Meyer (Ibid.), do not think that beauty 
matters. However, relying on Zangwill instead of Danto (as does Meyer) 
might lead to a less instrumental understanding of the aesthetic dimen-
sion of landscape. While experiences of landscapes can indeed be ‘vehicles 
for connecting with, or caring for, the world around us’ (Ibid.: 18), we agree 
with Zangwill that there is a certain value in acknowledging the aesthetic 
experience for its own sake. Zangwill emphasizes this point because he re-
jects instrumentalist theories of art (Zangwill 2007: 12). The pleasure we per-
ceive when contemplating works of art can be, but is not necessarily only, 
a means to an end, for example to raise environmental awareness. This is 
not to deny that the aesthetic experience of nature cannot enhance this 
awareness, but this consequence is not a (theoretically) necessary implica-
tion of aesthetic features. This is why we can still take aesthetic pleasure in 
scenes that show environmental destruction (Fig. 7), such as the ‘strange, 
toxic beauty of rainbow-colored water polluted by acidic mine drainage at 
a coal mine, the site of AMD Park in Vintondale, PA, USA’ (Meyer 2008: 8).
The production of aesthetic qualities
Aesthetic Creation Theory is not dogmatic about the way that aesthetic 
properties are produced. This means that it can accommodate aspects of 
other aesthetic theories. It can relate both to the meaning of Stourhead 
for an educated audience revelling in references to the Aenean story (Her-
rington 2008: 74) (Fig. 8), and to that part of the audience which, for in-
stance, relates to the colourful display of the tulip tree in autumn. So, a 
landscape designer is free to draw inspiration from the natural world, to 
Figure 7  Dangerous beauty_we can take aesthetic pleasure in scenes 
of environmental destruction. This is the former Magnasite Works, 
near Hartlepool, County Durham, England, where magnesium used 
to be extracted from seawater.
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imitate jagged mountains, or to borrow from the typologies of cultivation. 
There is room for the expression of emotions or cultural meaning, such as 
the planting of a weeping willow or a sombre yew tree in a graveyard. All 
that is needed for this to count as art is that the designer has had aesthetic 
insights and intentions to realize the aesthetic properties in virtue of the 
non-aesthetic properties. Zangwill’s position is also generous in allowing 
for aesthetic qualities other than just beauty (Zangwill 2007: 39), offering 
room, for instance, for the sublime as provided by the work of Latz and Part-
ners in Duisburg-Nord (Figs. 9 & 10) (cp. Herrington 2008: 78).
At this point, some landscape architects may conceivably object and say 
that they have never had these kinds of insights while designing. Zang-
will, however, maintains that the insights need not be expressed in words, 
nor even be conscious (Zangwill 2007: 49). The photographer Lewis Hine 
pointed to this feature of the inexpressibility of insights when he said: 
‘If I could tell the story in words, I wouldn’t need to lug a camera’ (Hine 
quoted in Sontag 1977: 145). The aesthetic insight must be there, but it does 
not need to be made verbally explicit by the designer or artist. The insight 
might, as Zangwill says, come forth in the drawing. It can be produced in 
the activity of sketching. ‘One can think in acting and making’ (Zangwill 
2007: 45; cp. Moore 2010). In landscape architecture the aesthetic intentions 
are typically very clear, sometimes much clearer than any ideological in-
tent. They are expressed in terms of drawings and written explanations of 
the design made before execution. Although Zangwill would generally not 
set much store in what artists say about their work (Zangwill 2007:49; cp. 
Herrington 2011: 209), drawings are reasonable indicators of the landscape 
architect’s aesthetic intentions.
One of the objections to considering architects and designers as art-
ists is that they do not, as a rule, create their works with their own hands. 
They produce drawings and specifications, which are then interpreted by 
builders and other contractors who execute the works on site. Aesthetic 
Creation Theory tames this objection by making a distinction between the 
essential creative phase, the process during which the essential aesthetic 
insights occur, and the execution of the design, during which these in-
sights are realized in the production of a work of art (Zangwill 2007: 45–46). 
For this very reason, Aesthetic Creation Theory can also help us to distin-
guish the ownership of ideas within the cooperative production of design. 
Zangwill writes that ‘[a]esthetic creativity or talent might be defined as 
the capacity to envisage non-actual things that would have a high degree 
of aesthetic value’ (Ibid.: 44). As his theory differentiates between insight 
and idea and because the originating insight is experiential, it should al-
ways be clear who owns the idea behind the design_it is the person who 
experienced the original insight. However, as landscape architecture his-
tory shows, one designed garden can embody insights from more than one 
person, in which case we could say that the work of art is a genuine col-
laboration. Very often, in the sorts of collaborative projects undertaken by 
landscape architects, the other collaborators will be people like ecologists, 
engineers, or foresters, who might not see the creation of aesthetic quali-
ties as any part of their role and, thus, not form (and follow) aesthetic in-
sights and intentions. 
Some designed landscapes (for example, the gardens at Stowe) have had 
many owners and several designers. In such a case, new works of art have 
been made upon the same site as the old, though traces of the former work 
may still be appreciated.
Aesthetic Creation Theory and the education of landscape architects
A clear field of congruency between Zangwill’s theory and the praxis of 
landscape architecture is in the development of a capacity for aesthetic in-
sight. In the discipline it is built up by studies in the field by students and 
practicing landscape architects and through the study of projects which 
have been illustrated and described. Field trips form part of the education 
of landscape architecture students, while the fieldwork included in their 
studio projects can be understood as an exploration into the relationship 
between non-aesthetic and aesthetic properties (Fig. 11). The non-aesthet-
ic properties can sometimes be studied more clearly, and certainly more 
Figure 8  Knowing the meaning of a garden scene can 
add layers to the aesthetic experience but is not a nec-
essary condition for it_a visitor can still take aesthetic 
pleasure in the gardens at Stourhead, Wiltshire, Eng-
land, even if the references to the Aenean story are lost 
on him or her.
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easily, in representations like maps and aerial photographs, but it is in 
the field that the aesthetic properties become apparent. Insights into the 
relationship between non-aesthetic and aesthetic properties can also be 
developed in the bureau excursions that many professional offices under-
take. In the book Distance and Engagement produced by the Vogt office (Fox-
ley & Vogt 2010) we find a description of the exploration of non-aesthetic 
and aesthetic qualities in trips taken by the office to the Burren in Ireland 
and to the engineering works of Vauban in France. Foxley and Vogt (2010: 
265–266) write that [t]he enormous potential for Vauban’s fortifications to 
inspire landscape architecture remains’. And indeed, in their subsequent 
design for the European Harbour in Bremen, for example, the stage-like 
steps are reminiscent of Vauban’s fortifications (Fig. 12).
In a high-pressure commercial environment, such excursions might 
be considered a luxury, or something peripheral to the main business of 
the office, but Aesthetic Creation Theory makes understandable why such 
activities are not trivial and why they need to be taken seriously, not just 
by practitioners, but also by scholarly researchers.
Another prevalent practice, the activity of sketching, also makes good 
sense within the framework of Aesthetic Creation Theory. In this light, the 
investigation of different characteristics of a site and possible solutions to 
a brief can be characterized as an exploration of sets of non-aesthetic prop-
erties and the aesthetic properties which they support. Frequently, both 
map drawings and small perspective sketches will be produced. Whereas 
the former often represent sets of non-aesthetic properties, the perspec-
tive sketches regularly seek to capture the aesthetic experiences to be had. 
Aesthetic Creation Theory could help further in landscape architecture 
education by showing students how to deal with a brief, and making clear 
to them that a brief still leaves room for artistry, since it never determines 
all design choices. Social factors, client’s wishes, and programmatic con-
straints ‘underdetermine the final product’ (Zangwill 2007: 148, original em-
phasis). In the ‘residual space’ the designer can act out his or her ‘freedom’ 
(Ibid.: 150) and realize ‘artistic autonomy’ (Ibid.: 147).
Aesthetic Creation Theory for critics
Zangwill’s theory also has consequences for the evaluation of designs. Be-
fore implementation of a work of landscape architecture there are plans 
and drawings. In the light of Aesthetic Creation Theory, these drawings 
are not just there to prescribe the non-aesthetic properties of the work, but 
can also be used to predict aesthetic effects. This is the moment for reflec-
tion on whether these effects are desirable and whether the proposed non-
aesthetic properties will give rise to them as predicted by the perspective 
drawings. After production of the work, judgments can be made about the 
extent to which the intended effects have been realized. With its empha-
sis on aesthetic intentions, Aesthetic Creation Theory provides the theo-
retical basis for differentiating between aesthetic properties that are the 
result of deliberate design intentions on the one hand and any accidental 
developments within the landscape that were not part of the original in-
tention on the other. 
A complication: the position of the audience
As mentioned above, Aesthetic Creation Theory is not an audience-based 
theory; rather, it focuses on the creation of art. For landscape architects, 
who are generally taught that their work must meet the needs of users, 
this may seem a strange, even off-putting, position, so it needs some fur-
ther explanation and qualification.
In landscape architecture there is clearly an audience (Ibid.: 145; foot-
note 15; Hunt 2004; Treib 2011). Similarly, there are often calls for the kinds 
of post-occupancy studies occasionally carried out on buildings to be un-
dertaken for designed landscapes. None of this, however, is incompati-
ble with Zangwill’s theory, nor does he ignore the audience or user side. 
Throughout his book, he attempts to make intelligible all of our art activ-
ities: why we value art, what it is that drives us to make and to behold it_
for example, both the production and consumption of art (Zangwill 2007: 
1). However, his theory is, in a sense, a bare-bones account of the essence 
of art (Ibid.: 159). (It is fair to add here that we are not all equally convinced 
by Zangwill’s bare-bones essentialism and that some of us have previously 
Figure 9  Zangwill’s theory allows for other aesthetic  
qualities than just beauty, for example experiences of  
the sublime in the Duisburg–Nord Landscape Park, Germany.
Figure 10  Sublime aesthetic experiences in the  
Duisburg-Nord Landscape Park
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written from a non-essentialist position.) Thus, Zangwill (Ibid.: 140) ar-
gues, the ‘minimum that we need for a rational explanation of the crea-
tion of art is the existence of the intention to realize valuable properties 
in the object or event’. 
However, while we have great sympathy for Zangwill’s elegant, mini-
malist, and consistent explanation of art, there is certainly the danger that 
his reasons for adopting an artist-centred approach may be ignored and 
his argumentation misused to re-enthrone the designer and disempower 
the user. This is emphatically not our purpose.
Conclusions
In this paper, we have introduced Zangwill’s Aesthetic Creation Theory 
into the landscape architecture discourse in an experimental spirit be-
cause we are convinced that it has much to offer the discipline. It can con-
tribute to redressing an imbalance in some strands in landscape architec-
tural theory by recovering the aesthetic dimension; it does so by thinking 
through the structure of those aesthetic theories whose legacy we believe 
to be responsible for a sceptical, or even hostile, attitude towards aesthet-
ics from some within the field. Zangwill’s theory allows us to see landscape 
architecture (once again) as an art_yet without the lofty aspirations and 
pretensions of art for art’s sake and with the explicit possibility of con-
sidering useful aspects; for example, social inclusion or ecological perfor-
mance. We think that the insights provided can add to both substantive 
and procedural theory in landscape architecture (cp. Lang 1987) as they 
provide knowledge on how creating aesthetic value might work and what 
landscape architects can do to improve the aesthetic quality of their work.
There are numerous links to existing studies, both within general land-
scape architecture theory and, particularly, in aesthetics. Some of these 
we could at least acknowledge, many others had to remain implicit, but 
surely all are worth exploring in future research. We welcome any philo-
sophically sound critique of Zangwill’s theory, or our interpretation of 
it, that might help to better explain works of landscape architecture and 
their production.
In this paper we have focused on explaining, in outlines, the basic features 
of Zangwill’s theory and we have begun to demonstrate how it makes intel-
ligible the art-related practice of our discipline. We believe, however, that 
Aesthetic Creation Theory also provides grounds for further developing 
sound criticism of works of landscape design_a criticism that is informed 
by an assessment of the degree to which intended aesthetic experiences are 
realized through the physical design. While the aesthetic dimension is, of 
course, not the only one to be considered, we think that the discipline needs 
a critical approach which does justice to the complete nature of works of 
landscape architecture by taking aesthetics fully into account.
Furthermore, we believe that Aesthetic Creation Theory provides argu-
ments that may prove useful in various strategically relevant contexts. The 
argument, for example, that human beings are able to enjoy aesthetic ex-
periences and thus find it worthwhile to invest in them provides reasons 
why certain jobs should be done by (or with) landscape architects, rather 
than by engineers (alone). Furthermore, by explaining the role of the re-
lation between non-aesthetic and aesthetic properties, the theory makes 
certain activities specific to landscape architects, such as extensive draw-
ing practice, bureau excursions, and field trips with students, intelligible. 
Departments of landscape architecture often find themselves in a position 
of having to defend their resources for teaching and research activities that 
can differ substantially from those of the more established disciplines. Be-
ing able to give an account of these and other idiosyncratic practices of the 
discipline as rational, may, we believe, prove extremely valuable in discus-
sion with university deans and leadership boards.
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Figure 11  During field trips, students of landscape architecture are 
sensitized to the relationship between aesthetic and non-aesthetic 
properties, training their capacity for aesthetic insight.
Figure 12  The stage-like steps in the European Harbour in Bremen, 
Germany, designed by the Vogt office, 2007–2012, seem clearly  
inspired by the engineering works of Vauban in France  
(Foxley & Vogt 2010: 265f.).
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